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On the morning of 11 March 2011, a combination of
earthquake, tsunami and the meltdown of three reactors at
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant hit the
Northeast of Japan. As radiation from the nuclear disaster
hit food production nationwide, levels of public anxiety and
concern mounted. Information on the scale and the extent
of the radioactive contamination was scarce and often
contradicting, while food contamination stories popped up
one after another, triggering mass consumer avoidance. In
the face of this unprecedented food crisis, ensuring ‘safe
food’ became urgent priority for the Japanese government.
The Japanese government’s responses to the radiation
risk after the Triple Disaster sparked much academic
debate and criticism, specifically from a consumer/citizen
angle. Governmental risk communication was criticized
for a strong simplification of the information, the levelling
out of scientific uncertainty, the normalisation of the
radiation risk, and its corrective aim in a one-way, topdown structure. Moreover, its focus on assuring the safety
of the Japanese food supply and promoting domestic food
consumption did not suffice in assisting Japanese
consumers in dealing with daily food safety worries. To the
contrary, this might even have jeopardized the health of
Japanese consumers (Kanda et al., 2015; Kimura, 2016,
2017; Takeda, 2017; Reiher, 2017). Studies on postFukushima risk communication in general have identified
several consumer expectations towards the government:
more transparency, a tightening of the gap between experts
and the general public, and a more citizen-centered
approach (Figueroa, 2013; Perko, 2016; Kimura, 2017;
2016; 2015; Reiher, 2017; Takeda, 2017; Yamaguchi, 2016;
Sternsdorff-Cisterna, 2015).
These findings are in line with the theoretical debate on
risk communication, food and trust. Until the end of the
1990s, the conventional approach to risk communication
was based on the information deficit model. Simply put,
the public’s lack of knowledge and technical understanding
was the problem, and this was solved by top-down
information provision. Experts selected the information
and assessment deemed necessary, leaving no room for the
opinions and perceptions of the lay public in this model,
despite the differing risk assessments on both sides (Slovic,
1987). As such, the model lent itself to the authorities’
attenuating or amplifying risks by the mere selection of
risks or expert opinions to convey (Renn, 2014, p.1277).
This model has shown to be ineffective, and risk
communication, like other forms of strategic
communication, is now understood to be more effective if
conceived of as an interactive, dialogic process (Siegrist,

Cvetkovich & Roth, 2000). Through dialogue, institutions
should aim to understand the perceptions and concerns of
the public, and adjust their risk management strategies
based on this knowledge, in order to restore public
confidence and trust (UNFAO, 2003; 2016; Löfstedt,
2005). Rather than mere dissemination of information or
normative persuasion, the goal of risk communication is
thus a two-way process of social learning, aimed at helping
people make informed decisions (Renn, 2014, p. 1278;
Siegrist, 2014, p. 1241; Arvai, 2014).
Although not without challenges and problems of its
own, this form of risk communication, including the
principles of participation, transparency and
communicated scientific uncertainty, has thus become the
standard (FAO 2016, EFSA 2017), to the extent that the
Japanese government officially signed up in 2004 (Food
Safety Commission, 2004; 2015). However, as this
presentation argues, the ostensible use of participatory and
transparent risk communication is often mere windowdressing, giving the impression of an open dialogue while
framing public fears as irrational, or simply wrong.
Drawing on theories and principles of risk
communication, this presentation analyses how the
Japanese government sought to restore the notion of ‘safe
food’ in the uncertain aftermath of the Fukushima
disaster. For this purpose, it applies a qualitative content
analysis (Mayring, 2000; Kohlbacher, 2005) on
representative governmental material for three selected
case studies of risk communication spanning different
stages after the disaster (2011-2019); firstly the setting of
both provisional and adjusted radiation standards,
secondly the so-called ‘Risk Communicators Programme’
and thirdly the efforts of the ‘Fūhyō Higai [harmful
rumours] Taskforce’.
Conflicting Radiation Standards
Reports of food contamination emerged within a week of
the onset of the Fukushima disaster. As public anxiety did
not subside despite governmental reassurances, the need to
establish and communicate limits for what defined ‘safe
food’ became apparent. On March 17, 2011, the Ministry
of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) issued
Provisional Regulatory Values (PRVs). Given the general
scientific uncertainty on the subject and the urgency of the
matter, the Food Safety Commission did not endorse the
scientific appropriateness of the PRVs (FSC, 2011).
However, high level governmental representatives kept
reassuring the public and advocating for solidarity with the
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affected farmers in the Northeast of Japan by not avoiding
their produce. At the same time, local and national
politicians’ actions and comments further amplified
confusion. Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintarō for example
appeared on television drinking tap water, the day after
bottled water was being distributed to residents because of
the restriction on tap water consumption (ABC News,
2011). Despite this official reassurance, consumer
organizations and experts immediately voiced their
skepticism and criticism towards the legitimacy,
methodology and the actual implementation of the
government-set provisional standards. Anxiety among the
public regarding the food safety situation was high and
causally related to the PRVs and their doubtful basis.
In order to address this problem of trust, the Japanese
government announced new -clearly stricter- standards.
However, despite their announcement in October 2011,
the new standards would only be effective as of April 2012
– more than six months later. The poor communication
and the delayed introduction of these tighter standards left
the public wondering about the food that they were and
had been eating so far (Sternsdorff-Cisterna, 2013,
Kimura, 2016). How could food in October 2011 be
guaranteed as absolutely safe [anzen], if in April 2012 it
would no longer be?
Although surely placed in a difficult situation, the initial
response to the radioactive contamination of food by the
Japanese authorities was thus not able to do the basics:
provide the consumer with consistent and simple
information on how to manage the food risk in their daily
life. Instead, the response was reactive, inconsistent, and
confusing, sowing distrust and uncertainty among the
public and other stakeholders. The later risk
communication focuses precisely on this public
uncertainty – rather than on contaminated food – as
harmful and dangerous to Japanese food consumers and
producers, without acknowledging the role of the earlier
contradictory risk communication in creating the
uncertainty in the first place.
Risk Communicators and ‘Correct Information’
As one response to calls for improved risk communication,
specifically regarding food, the government initiated a
program in September 2013 aimed at training citizens as
certified Radiation Risk Communicators (RRC, Shokuhinchū
no hōshaseibusshitsu ni kansuru komyunikētā [Communicators
on Radioactive Substances in Food] (Kimura, 2016, pp.
58-59). The idea was to educate a group of citizens in food
and radiation, and they would then spread ‘correct
information’ (seikakuna jōhō) about the national food
safety situation and teach their fellow consumers how to
manage food risk by themselves (CAA, 2013).
At first glance, the RRC program appears to embrace
and encapsulate modern, participative risk communication:
the program actively engages in a dialogue with consumers,

and even uses these consumers as a medium of risk
communication to inform the wider public about food
risks. However, a closer look at the material used in the
sessions clearly shows the intention of the program to
‘correct’ the public’s ‘misunderstanding’ against the
backdrop of the ‘harmful rumours’-discourse or fūhyō higai
– referring to the economic impact of rumours harming
the reputation of Japan’s rural and industrial economies.
The government’s role in creating this doubt in the first
place is conspicuous by its mere absence in the material.
A focus on ‘correct information’ reduces the ambiguous
problem to a reassuringly simple issue, hinting at the
knowledge deficit model of risk communication that
presumes the consumer as unknowledgeable in terms of
scientific matters. The danger is thus not radiation, which
is clearly under control according to the government.
Rather, the public’s uncertainty and lack of correct
knowledge is the real risk in terms of food safety. The
solution logically lies in educating and informing the
public and correcting their understanding and behaviour, a
responsibility which now rests in the hands of the
participants of the course. At its heart, the RRC program
was thus really about preventing the so-called ‘harmful
rumours’ ( fūhyō higai) rather than engaging in meaningful
state-public dialogue about radiation risks. As such, both
risk communication and risk management go hand in hand
here: the radiation risk is managed by communicating the
‘correct information’.
The Fūhyō Higai Taskforce battling harmful rumours
From the earliest responses on, the government’s priority
was thus on preventing damage by so-called rumours, and
this anti-rumour strategy was quickly integrated into their
risk communication efforts. With the establishment of the
Fūhyō Higai Taskforce [Genshiryoku Saigai Fūhyō Higai
Eikyō Taisaku Task Force] in 2013, the communication
effort to counter the risk of widespread rumours was put to
the next gear. The ‘Taskforce to Respond to Effects of
Harmful Rumours related to the Nuclear Accident’ is part
of a policy package of the Abe administration, which aims
to accelerate the reconstruction and revitalisation of the
Tohoku region after the Fukushima disaster
(Reconstruction Agency, 2014; Terasako, 2018). In 2019
still, the most recent campaign material tries to persuade
its intended audience in the same simplistic way as before:
Japan’s food radiation standards are ‘the strictest in the
world’ (Reconstruction Agency, 2018), while consumer
avoidance is an immoral and selfish act towards the
affected farmers and the reconstruction of the region.
In line with the official message of control and progress
touted by PM Abe and his government as the country hosts
both the Rugby World Cup (2019) and the Summer
Olympics (2020), food-related risk communication
increasingly stresses progress and introduces forwardlooking initiatives, while glossing over remaining health
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risks or inconvenient truths (Asahi Shimbun, 2019). While
the focus on ‘correct information’ dissemination persists,
the discourse has clearly moved away from the fūhyō higai
narrative and irrational consumer concerns. At the same
time, the material hints at a fatigue with the issue of
radiation, and gives the impression Japan is ready to close
off this chapter.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this presentation demonstrates how the
governmental risk communication efforts, although aimed
at managing the various food risks, actually contributed to
and intensified public confusion and uncertainty, and as
such eroded institutional trust in the domestic food
governance system. Despite this rocky start in the initial
reaction to the disaster, the food safety authorities have
acknowledged these failures in terms of risk communication
and included efforts towards stakeholder participation over
time. Nevertheless, despite its official subscription to a
form of ‘interactive’ risk communication which does not
use ‘the persuasion strategy’ (CAA, 2019), governmental
campaigns are still symptomatic of old-school conceptualizations
of risk communication and broader persisting issues within
the Japanese food governance system.
The most recent intensified communication efforts,
including much newly published and produced material,
hint at a wish to close of the Fukushima chapter, maybe
just in time for the Summer Olympics 2020.
Unfortunately, recent developments at the plant might
jeopardize these strategic efforts and the public diplomacy
efforts pushing the idea that the disaster is ‘under control’
might have the opposite effects (Asahi Shimbun, 2019).

251

Reference list
Consumer Affairs Agency (CAA) (2013). ‘Shokuhinchū
no hōshaseibusshitsu ni kansuru komyunikētā kenshū
ni tsuite’ [About communicator training on radioactive
substances in food]. www.caa.go.jp [online] Available at
http://www.caa.go.jp/jisin/r_index.html#commu
[Accessed 29 April 2020].
Food Safety Commission (FSC) (2011). ‘Emergency
Report on Radioactive Nuclides in Foods’. www.fsc.
go.jp [online] Available at http://www.fsc.go.jp/
english/emerg/emergency_report_radioactive_
nuclides.pdf [Accessed 29 April 2020].
Kimura, A. H. (2016). Radiation Brain Moms and Citizen
Scientists. The Gender politics of Food Contamination
after Fukushima. Durham: Duke University Press.
Reconstruction Agency (RA) (2019). ‘Eliminating negative
reputation impact’. www.reconstruction.go.jp [online]
Available at https://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/
main-cat1/sub-cat1-4/fuhyou/pamphlet/latest/
huhyou-higai-husshoku_E.pdf [Accessed 29 April 2020].
Renn, O. (2014). ‘Four questions for risk communication: a
response to Roger Kasperson’. Journal of Risk Research,
17(10), pp. 1277-1281.
Reiher, C. (2017). ‘Food safety and consumer trust in
post-Fukushima Japan’. Japan Forum, 29(1), pp. 53-76.
Sternsdorff-Cisterna, N. (2015). ‘Food after Fukushima:
Risk and Scientific Citizenship in Japan’. American
Anthropologist, 117(3), pp. 455-467.
Takeda, H. (2017). ‘National Solidarity of Food Insecurity:
Food Practice and Nationalism in Post-3/11 Japan’. In:
Niehaus, A., and Walravens, T., eds. Feeding Japan: The
Cultural and Political Issues of Dependency and Risk.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 475-505.

